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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-IS TIME RUNNING OUT FOR
THE GOVERNMENT TO DISPUTE REGULATORY TAK--
INGS?-First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of
Los Angeles
INTRODUCTION
In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Los
Angeles,' the United States Supreme Court decided a landmark
takings issue in favor of a private landowner against the govern-
ment. The Court thus continued its attempts "to relieve [the] in-
herent tension between police power and eminent domain" analy-
ses.2 In doing so, the Court finally laid to rest "the still-persistent
argument that takings and regulations should be mutually exclu-
sive concepts, especially as they relate to land use controls." 3 The
Court extended the full complement of eminent domain causes of
action and remedies to landowners suing for regulatory interfer-
ence under inverse condemnation theory.
In First English, the Court recognized a new type of inverse
condemnation "taking," a "temporary,"' "interim," 5 or "partial"6
taking for which a regulator must compensate a private property
owner. Until recently, judicial decisions prevented a private prop-
erty owner from receiving compensation for governmental regula-
1. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987) [hereinafter First English].
2. Kratovil, Eminent Domain Revisited and Some Land Use Problems, 34
DEPAUL L. REv. 587, 593 (1985).
3. Bauman, The Supreme Court, Inverse Condemnation and the Fifth
Amendment: Justice Brennan Confronts the Inevitable in Land Use Controls, 15
RUTGERS L.J. 15 (1983).
4. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2383.
5. See, e.g., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561,
2574 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San
Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 659 (1981). See also Johnson, Compensation for Invalid
Land-Use Regulations, 15 GEORGIA L. REV. 559, 593 (1981).
6. Comment, Compensation for a Partial Taking of Property: Balancing
Factors in Eminent Domain, 72 YALE L.J. 392 (1962) [hereinafter Partial
Taking].
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tory interference. However, in First English, the Supreme Court
recognized for the first time that mere invalidation of the regula-
tion would not restore the owner's lost use of the property and that
such loss could be remedied only by money damages. The Court
decided that some circumstances compel the. regulator to compen-
sate the owner no matter how short the time period in which the
government deprived the owner of property use.
However, in its eagerness to address the "temporariness" as-
pect of regulatory takings, the Court injected a new element into
the controversy: the litigational time factor. 7 The effect of this ele-
ment on regulators will be swift and severe. In its efforts to curb
abuses of regulator power, the Court gave private developers and
owners a tool so powerful that the rationality of the eminent do-
main decision is overshadowed by potential problems. In takings
law, the more things change, the more they stay the same.
This Note will trace the evolution of regulatory "temporary"
takings from its roots in traditional eminent domain law and ex-
amine the practical effects of the Court's decision on regulatory
takings analysis. The analysis will specifically question what period
of time during the pendency of takings litigation will constitute a
"considerable" enough length of time that it becomes a factor in
takings analysis and remedies. This Note will conclude that al-
though the First English decision will increase the number of chal-
lenges to regulator actions and increase regulator liability it proba-
bly will not enhance the actual compensation amount that
aggrieved landowners receive.
THE CASE
The First English Evangelical Lutheran Church owned land,
occupied by several buildings, constituting a campground.8 The
campground, Lutherglen, was used as a retreat and as a recrea-
tional area for handicapped children.9 A flood destroyed the build-
ings in 1978, and in 1979 the County of Los Angeles adopted an
interim ordinance that included Lutherglen in a flood-protection
area and banned further construction in the area.10 The ordinance
prohibited any attempt by the church to rebuild Lutherglen.
Within two months, the church sued the county for monetary dam-
7. This is the length of time consumed by the litigation of whether a taking
occurred.
8. 107 S. Ct. at 2381.
9. Id.
10. Id.
[Vol. 10:275
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ages for inverse condemnation on the theory that the regulation
denied the church all use of its property."
The trial court granted the county's motion to strike the
church's complaint for failure to request the proper relief for a reg-
ulatory taking, which at that time was limited to declaratory relief
or a writ of mandamus.12 Because of the defective form of the
pleading, the court ignored the church's allegations that it was de-
prived of all use of its property. The court relied on Agins v. City
of Tiburnon," which held that a landowner could not force a regu-
lator to exercise eminent domain through inverse condemnation
proceedings challenging an invalid regulatory taking.14 The church
appealed to the California Court of Appeal, which affirmed the dis-
missal of the complaint based on the Agins decision.' 5 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court denied the church further review of the dismis-
sal and the church appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
which granted the writ of certiorari. 6
The Supreme-Court reversed and remanded the case to the
lower courts, holding that monetary damages is a proper form of
relief for an invalid regulatory taking. The Court recognized that,
even if the regulator rescinded the regulation, no other form of re-
lief could remedy the prior injury to the private owner.' 7 The
Court held that regulatory interference with an owner's use of his
property to the extent that the owner had no use of the property
at all constituted a compensable injury regardless of the duration
of the interference.' 8 The Court termed such egregious regulatory
interference a temporary taking because the duration of the taking
ended when the regulator decided not to exercise eminent do-
main. "'9 The Court defined the "temporary taking" as the owner's
total loss of use of the property for the time span between the reg-
11. Id. at 2382. The church also sued the county in tort for negligent cloud
seeding. The church contended that the flooding of Lutherglen resulted in part
from the government's overzealous efforts to provide rain runoff for its water
supply.
12. Id. at 2383.
13. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
14. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2381.
15. Id. At the time that the California Supreme Court denied a hearing, the
interference with the property was approximately seven years old. When the Su-
preme Court decided the case, the interference was approximately nine years old.
Id. at 2388.
16. Id. at 2383.
17. Id. at 2389.
18. Id. at 2388.
19. Id. at 2387.
1988]
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ulator's interference with the owner's use and a court's invalidation
of the regulation pursuant to the owner's challenge.20
To reach the remedy issue, the Court assumed without holding
that the regulation "took" all use of the land from the owner "for a
considerable period of years"'" and that the deprivation of use of
the land during "this period of years '22 constituted a compensable
taking. For application of the new "temporary" cause of action and
the new remedy, the Court remanded the case to the lower court to
determine whether the government actually denied the church the
total use of its property.
The Court also held that the government was free to elect to
end the "taking" by traditional actions subsequent to the court's
adjudication, such as repealing or amending the regulation. 23 How-
ever, these actions would not reduce the government's liability for
the period of time encompassed by the " 'temporary' regulatory
taking. 2 4
The Court ended its decision with a cryptic statement in
which it distinguished between different types of litigational delay
in "takings" suits. The Court described the first period of time as
permissible "normal delays" in the regulator's decision-making
process for granting "building permits, changes in zoning ordi-
nances, variances and the like."2 5 The owner should expect no
compensation for these delays, even though the owner had no use
of the land during the delay. 6 The second period of time, un-
named and undefined, presumably would contribute to the court's
finding that the regulator's actions worked a taking of the owner's
property.
BACKGROUND
Understanding the new cause of action and the new remedy
created in the First English decision requires an understanding of
the development of eminent domain2 7 law. The fifth amendment
20. Id. at 2383.
21. Id. at 2389.
22. Id. at 2384.
23. Id. at 2389.
24. Id. at 2381.
25. Id. at 2389.
26. Id. "We limit our holding to the facts presented ... quite different ques-
tions [from] normal delays . . . which are not before us."
27. For a history of the term "eminent domain," see Bauman, supra note 3,
at 50-51. The eminent domain power is employed by federal, state, and local gov-
ernments, public utilities, and some specialized local governmental agencies, such
[Vol. 10:275
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requires that government shall not abridge certain rights of citi-
zens; "nor shall private property be taken for public use without
just compensation. '28 Originally, only the government could act to
condemn property and compensate owners through the process
known as eminent domain. However, because of the "self-execut-
ing"29 nature of the fifth amendment, courts allowed landowners to
bring suits in inverse condemnation 0 to accomplish informally the
guarantee that government failed to provide formally - compen-
sation for land taken."'
The first recognized basis for eminent domain and inverse
condemnation actions was a taking by physical interference. 32
However, courts gradually interpreted these two actions to encom-
pass other governmental conduct, such as nonphysical interfer-
ences with owner rights. 3 Justice Holmes first advanced the notion
that regulatory interferences with owner rights could constitute a
taking in his 1922 opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.3 4
Setting the pattern for future Supreme Court "nondecisions"' 5 in
as sewage and park districts. J. Sackman, 1 NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT Do-
MAIN §§ 3.1 to 3.232, pp. 3-1 to 3-248 (Rohan 3d ed. 1987) [hereinafter NICHOLS].
28. U. S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment governs state actions
through the fourteenth amendment. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago,
166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897). "Compensation clauses are included in all state constitu-
tions except North Carolina's, whose courts have added such a provision by inter-
pretation." Bauman, supra note 3, at 19 n.7. 1
29. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2386; 3 NICHOLS, supra note 27, § 8.1[4], p. 8-
51 n.24. "It is a self-executing remedy, derived directly from the constitution's
just compensation clause and without need of enabling legislation." Bauman,
supra note 3, at 45.
30. For a discussion of the term "inverse condemnation," see San Diego, 450
U.S. at 638 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Smith v. City of Charlotte, 79
N.C. App. 517, 339 S.E.2d 844 (1986). North Carolina inverse condemnation ac-
tion is pursuant to N. C. GEN. STAT. § 40A-51(a) (1981). See also Bauman, supra
note 3, at 45 nn.153-56; Kratovil, supra note 2, at 589-591; 2 NICHOLS, supra note
27, § 6.21, p. 6-136; 3 NICHOLS, supra note 27, § 8.1[4] [a], p. 8-32; 27 AM. JUR. 2n
Eminent Domain § 478, p. 411.
31. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2386.
32. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall. 166) (1871). See also 2
NICHOLS § 6.09, p. 6-55.
33. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (Government air-
plane flights over a chicken farm interfered with the private owner's rights.) 3
NICHOLS § 8.1[41, p. 8-43.
34. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
35. The Supreme Court repeatedly has offered guidelines to interpret
whether a taking occurred without actually holding that a taking occurred. See
19881 279
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regulatory takings cases, Justice Holmes stated that "if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking .... "36 The concept
of a "taking" is central to compensation according to the constitu-
tional requirement,37 and its lack of definition creates the bulk of
problems in analysis of the validity of regulations. 38 In Pennsylva-
nia Coal Co., the Court advanced the theory of regulatory takings
without indicating how far the normally noncompensable regula-
tion must go before impermissibly crossing into the compensable
taking category. Unfortunately, it is not possible to say that one
knows a taking when one sees it.
The custom of judicial deference to state regulation in the
form of "police power" regulatory exercises complicates the sim-
plicity of Justice Holmes' statement.39 Until the First English de-
cision, courts created a dichotomy of analysis of governmental ac-
tion based on whether the government's conduct was under the
rubric of "eminent domain" or "police powers," reserving almost
absolute protection for police powers. ° In 1926, the Court diluted
Justice Holmes' new concept of a regulatory taking in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Corp.4' The Court held that zoning and
other land-use regulations are permissible and noncompensable ex-
ercises of police powers.42 As a natural result of this protection,
regulators expanded the use of police powers to accomplish many
goals in land-use management by zoning. Such expansion creates
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 108 S. Ct. 849 (1988) (Considering a rent control
ordinance, the Court most recently rejected a takings argument, stating that the
constitutionality of laws should not be decided unless an actual factual setting
makes such a decision necessary).
36. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415. See also Goldblatt v. Hemp-
stead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). The Supreme Court had never actually held that
inverse condemnation encompasses impermissible regulation; nor had it stated
what its remedy would be. Johnson, supra note 5, at 587.
37. For an excellent overview of takings analyses policy theories see Bauman,
supra note 3, at 20-44. See also Kratovil, supra note 2, at 593 n.38.
38. Comment, Land Use Control Through Municipal Delay: The Case for an
Eminent Domain Remedy, 11 THE URBAN LAWYER 311, 315 n.17 (Spring, 1979).
39. For a discussion of the concept of police powers, see Hadacheck v. Sebas-
tian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Poor Richards, Inc. v. Stone, 86 N.C. App. 137, 140, 356
S.E.2d 828, 831 (1987); Bauman, supra note 3, at 53.
40. 1 Nichols § 1.42, p. 1-133; Kratovil, supra note 2, at 592. Police powers
could not constitute a taking of land. To solve the problem of finding a taking,
the courts would hold that the governmental action was outside the exercise of
permissible police powers and not a police power exercise at all.
41. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
42. Id. at 397.
280 [Vol. 10:275
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the potential for abuses which the courts must address. "And as
the 'police power' is adapted for more and more increasingly com-
plex applications, the police power/eminent domain dichotomy be-
comes less useful and more anachronistic." '
The judicial and legislative branches did not always strictly
separate police power regulation from eminent domain compensa-
tion. At one time, courts recognized the concept of "compensatory
zoning," but it fell into disfavor after the Supreme Court's decision
supporting noncompensatory zoning in Euclid v. Ambler."4 In
"compensatory zoning" the government voluntarily and automati-
cally compensated private landowners for police power zoning pro-
visions that affected private land. 5
Property owners did not use efficiently the inverse condemna-
tion remedy to challenge land-use regulations until the 1970s."'
The majority of attempts by private owners to stop government
regulations by the inverse condemnation remedy have been in zon-
ing47 and in landmark designation.48 Within this context, the
courts rebuffed the first attempts to secure compensation for regu-
latory takings,'9 allowing only declaratory relief.
Traditionally, the Court judged allegedly nonregulatory tak-
ings by the effect of the governmental conduct on the property
owner rather than by the method of conduct.50 It perceived that
some governmental conduct affected private property interests
prior to the government's formal eminent domain conduct. From
out of this judicial perception grew a body of law holding that the
landowner could bring suit in inverse condemnation to recover for
the government's conduct prior to its decision to take the land.5 1
43. Bauman, supra note 3, at 53.
44. 272 U.S. 365. See Kratovil supra note 2, at 613; Comment, Land Use
Control Through Municipal Delay: The Case for an Eminent Domain Remedy,
11 THE URBAN LAWYER 311, 317 n.30 (1979).
45. Annotation, Validity and Construction of "Zoning with Compensation"
Regulations, 41 A.L.R.3d 636 (1972).
46. Bauman, supra note 3, at 45.
47. Agins, 447 U.S. 255.
48. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (no taking oc-
curred). See also 3 NICHOLS § 8.1[4][a], p. 8-53. But see Benenson v. United
States, 548 F.2d 939 (Cl. Ct. 1977) (government inaction constituted a taking.)
49. 3 NICHOLS § 8.1[4][a], p. 8-53; Johnson, supra note 5, at 584.
50. Bauman, supra note 3, at 25.
51. Kanner, Condemnation Blight: Just How Just is Just Compensation?, 48
NOTRE DAME LAWYER 765 (April 1973). The concept of a de facto taking had its
roots in the case of United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947).
1988]
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The prior conduct itself could work a taking of private land by
action or inaction.5 2 This implied taking is known as a de facto53
taking, in contrast to the government's intentional de jure tak-
ing.54 Courts pronounced a de facto taking when governmental
conduct implied that the government's intent was to hold the land
in "limbo"55 until it decided whether to actually take the land. The
underlying policy was the obvious unfairness to landowners de-
prived of the use or value of their property for lengthy periods of
time after which the government either abandoned 6 or refused to
institute eminent domain proceedings.57 One of the factors courts
considered in assessing de facto takings was the conduct of the
government and its role in delaying proceedings to avoid compen-
sation,58 to devalue property,59 or merely to decide whether to in-
stitute eminent domain action.60 Although the government's bad
faith is an element of this analysis,61 courts have held that govern-
52. Comment, supra note 44, at 319-20. "[Glovernmental actions short of ac-
quisition or occupancy may constitute a constructive or de facto taking ... .
Thomas W. Garland, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 596 F.2d 784, 787 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 899 (1979). See also Donohoe Construction Co., Inc. v. Mont-
gomery County Council, 567 F.2d 603, 608 (4th Cir. 1977).
53. San Diego, 450 U.S. at 653.
54. See generally, 4 NICHOLS § 12.3151[5], p. 12-475; 3 NICHOLS § 8.1[4], p. 8-
53.
55. Comment, supra note 44, at 327.
56. 27 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 453, p. 371, § 454, p. 375. See, e.g.,
Foster v. City of Detroit, 405 F.2d 138, 141 (6th Cir. 1968).
57. See, e.g., Smith v. Erie R.R. Co., 134 Ohio St. 135, 16 N.E.2d 310, 313
(1938) (unreasonable delay in completing condemnation procedures).
58. See generally, Annotation, Plotting or Planning in Anticipation of Im-
provements as Taking or Damaging of Property Affected, 37 A.L.R.3d 127 (1971).
59. Comment, supra note 44, at 318. See, e.g., Drakes Bay Land Co. v.
United States, 424 F.2d 574, 586 (Cl. Ct. 1970), in which the government's con-
duct in refusing to condemn a private developer's land was held to be a taking
after a delay of approximately six years.
60. Because the measure of compensation that the government must pay the
owner in an eminent domain suit is the fair market value of the property just
prior to the taking, the government's advantage in reducing the market value is
obvious. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373-74 (1943). "In general there is
room for the doctrine that the government cannot use the threat of eminent do-
main to drive down established market prices." Reservation Eleven Assoc. v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 420 F.2d 153, 157 (1969) (the announcement of government
plans do not rise to the level of de facto interference).
61. Kanner, supra note 51, at 769: "[Slome of the most effective municipal
responses involve no action at all. Inordinate delay in the municipal decision-
making process is one such response." See also United States v. Dickinson, 331
8
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ments in fact took property during the process of deciding in good
faith whether to exercise eminent domain proceedings.6 2
Judicial decisions have granted the sovereign some breathing
room for its decision-making eminent domain process, character-
ized as "normal delay"63 or "preliminary activities. 6 4 The delay in
the decision-making process becomes a factor in the issue of
whether a taking occurred if a court holds that the delay was "op-
pressive."" The sovereign's unreasonable delay is an abuse of the
decision-making process for which the sovereign must compensate
the property owner, 6 just as the government's exercise of police
power affecting private property must be reasonable.6
U.S. at 748.
62. "[Justice] Stevens' presumption [in concurring with the majority opinion
in San Diego] that governments act in good faith in establishing such regulations,
however, is unrealistic in light of Justice Brennan's depiction of what actually
takes place in the real world of land use regulation. Nothing in the Constitution
requires the Court to be guided by a myth that experience has exploded."
Kratovil, supra note 2, at 600 (footnote omitted). See also Kanner, supra note 51,
at 769; Kratovil, supra note 2, at 591-592, 27 AM.JUR.2D Eminent Domain § 461,
p. 381.
63. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2373.
64. Id. at 267, citing Agins, 447 U. S. at 263 n.9. "Preliminary activities" en-
compasses the planning of the regulator prior to its formal condemnatory action
and does not constitute a de facto taking. These preliminary activities, such as
the public announcement of the intent to condemn land, may lessen the land
value. The lessening-of value, often termed "blight," is deemed noncompensable.
"[T]he mere declaration of blight and other initial steps authorizing condemna-
tion, even if they result in a decline in property values, do not constitute a taking
requiring compensation to the property owner." Thomas W. Garland, 596 F.2d at
787, citing Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. at 286. Accord Donohoe Construc-
tion Co., Inc. v. Montgomery City Council, 567 F.2d at 609; Foster v. City of De-
troit, 405 F.2d at 141; Virgin Islands v. 50.05 Acres, 185 F. Supp. 495, 498
(D.C.V.I. 1960). For a discussion of condemnation blight as distinguished from a
de facto taking, see 4 NiCHOLS § 12.315[5], p. 12-475; Kanner, supra note 51.
65. For an example of oppressive delay that caused a taking, see Klopping v.
City of Whittier, 8 Cal. App. 3d 39, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1, 500 P.2d 1345 (1972). See
also Donohoe, 567 F.2d at 609 (the council did not act in an "unreasonably dila-
tory manner . . . although "it has made no attempt during the three-year pen-
dency of this suit either to institute condemnation proceedings to to remove the
'cloud of condemnation.' ") But see City of Walnut Creek v. Leadership Housing
Systems, 73 Cal. App. 3d 611, 622, 140 Cal. Rptr. 690, 696 (1977); Foster, 405 F.2d
138 (10-year delay before the government abandoned condemnation proceedings
worked a taking).
66. Comment, supra note 44, at 321-22.
67.
While a City Commission certainly possesses the prerogative of deciding
1988]
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Courts traditionally recognized de facto takings in nonregu-
latory governmental actions. However, the courts rarely applied
the designation to regulatory actions until the First English
decision.
ANALYSIS
In First English, the Court found the perfect set of circum-
stances in which to extend the inverse condemnation cause of ac-
tion to embrace the full theories of eminent domain. The Court
had searched unsuccessfully"' to find a case in which it could avoid
the difficult issues of whether the regulator's action constituted a
taking and whether the taking sufficiently deprived the owner of
property value to overcome the public health, safety, and welfare
interests inherent in police power exercises. To address the dura-
tional factor in regulatory takings and the remedy for such takings,
the Court from the lower courts' decisions assumed both that the
regulator "took" the property" and that the taking deprived the
owner of all use of the property.70 The Court's two assumptions
surmounted the practical barriers that previously had prevented
the Court from modifying the mutually exclusive theories of emi-
nent domain and police powers.7 1 The Court now could advance its
position that these two entangled property law doctrines were
to defer action on such a proposal [for a building permit] over a long
period of time, it must assume the attendant responsibility for the ad-
verse effect it knows or should know its deliberate inaction will have
upon the parties with whom it is dealing.
Hollywood Beach Hotel Co. v. City of Hollywood, 321 So. 2d 10, 18 (Fla. 1976)
(The Florida Supreme Court did not utilize a compensation remedy, but it pre-
vented the city from implementing a zoning change). One commentator gathers
authority and postulates that the regulator's "acquisitory purpose" is a factor in
determining whether a delay constituted a taking. Johnson, supra note 5, at 588-
89. The measure of compensation for a de facto taking is a major diminution in
value of the property during the period of the government's oppressive conduct. A
"mere" diminution in property value is insufficient. Danforth, 308 U.S. at 283.
Logically, a total taking results in a complete diminution in value so that "the
condemnor, theoretically, pays the full market value." Kratovil, supra note 2, at
593.
68. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2383. "Four times this decade, we have con-
sidered similar claims and have found ourselves for one reason or another unable
to consider the merits of the Agins rule [no compensation for a regulatory
taking]."
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2389.
71. Bauman, supra note 3, at 32.
[Vol. 10:275
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merely the polar extremes of the same spectrum of legal analysis, a
confirmation of the "unitary nature of police power and eminent
domain."72
In practical terms, the Court's holding provides incentive to
property owners to challenge prohibitory regulations to gain com-
pensation despite the regulator's refusal to exercise its power of
eminent domain. The new inverse condemnation cause of action
and remedy benefit owners because governmental regulatory action
now merits the same scrutiny and limitations as governmental emi-
nent domain actions.
Several factors soften the apparent suddenness of the Court's
holding in First English. First, prior court decisions,7 s dissents,4
and commentary75 raised the possibility of extending the tempo-
rary takings doctrine from the eminent domain context to regula-
tory inverse condemnation proceedings. Second, a recent decision
by the Court exalted some private property rights to unprece-
dented heights in current takings analysis. 76 Third, flood-control
regulation is one of the-forms of land-use regulation that courts are
more likely to hold as excessive when challenged by property own-
ers.77 Fourth, police powers traditionally enjoy such deferential
treatment from courts analyzing the scope of the regulations that
only a total deprivation of private use of the property would over-
come judicial deference to sovereign actions.78
The Court's decision in First English was the culmination of a
logical and orderly progression in takings analysis that had as its
72. Kratovil, supra note 2, at 609.
73. See generally Bauman, supra note 3, at 47-48 n.165; for much earlier
cases, see Comment, supra note 38, at 313 n.5; Kratovil, supra note 2, at 598 n.65.
74. See San Diego, 450 U.S. at 636 (Brennan, J., dissenting) and Bauman's
discussion of its genesis, supra note 3, at 58.
75. Bauman, supra note 3, at 18-32.
76. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3145 (1987) (the
right to exclude others). See generally Bauman, supra note 3, at 67-68. One com-
mentator traces this exaltation to the roots of natural law underlying the Ameri-
can value system. Kratovil, supra note 2, at 606; Comment, supra note 38, at 323.
77. See generally, Plater, The Takings Issue in A Natural Setting: Flood-
lines and the Police Power, 52 Thx. L. REV. 201 (1974); Van Alstyne, Taking or
Damage by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 So.
CAL. L. REV. 1, 24-25 n.116 (1971); Comment, supra note 38, at 326. See, e.g.,
Martino v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist., 703 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 151 (1984). Within the context of physical encroachment on
private land by flood waters, see United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947).
78. Bauman, supra note 3, at 31.
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basis the considerations of "fairness and justice." 79 Implicit in the
Court's decision is the conviction that a taking results in the same
injury to the landowner without regard to the form of governmen-
tal action. The government's action in taking the property,
whether "taking by"80 the government in eminent domain proceed-
ings or "taking away"81 property rights from the landowner by the
governmental regulation, was irrelevant to the deprivation if the
deprivation was severe enough.
According to some commentators, the abuse of decision-mak-
ing delay is as pervasive as the abuse of governmental delays that
result in de facto takings under color of processing eminent do-
main decisions, and the abuse deserves the same remedy. 2 Munici-
pal zoning ordinances are a specific area of regulation in which in-
tentional delays in deciding the appropriateness of regulation
suppresses private development much more effectively than the
regulation itself.88 Motivated by carelessly concealed and inappro-
priate sovereign motives,' 4 the Court used First English as a vehi-
cle in which to equalize the analysis between eminent domain law
and inverse condemnation law. If the Court had ended its decision
with this fundamental change in analysis of regulatory takings, the
First English decision would have fulfilled commentators' predic-
tions that judicial common sense and fairness toward private inter-
ests would prevail over convoluted, outdated, and unsupportable
takings evolution. 8 However, the Court's evident frustration with
the unfairness of current takings analysis caused the decision's
79. As is typical of the whole of takings analysis, neither courts nor commen-
tators can agree on the constitutional basis for the "fairness" element of takings
decisions. The dispute is whether the fairness concept emanates from the fifth
amendment or from the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. First
English, 107 S. Ct. at 2390, 2399 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Bauman, supra note 3,
at 53. "The Fifth Amendment expresses a principle of fairness and not a technical
rule of procedure enshrining old or new niceties regarding 'causes of action' -
when they are born, whether they proliferate, and when they die." Dickinson, 331
U.S. at 748.
80. Kratovil, supra note 2, at 588.
81. Id.
82. Kratovil, supra note 2, at 591-92; Comment, supra note 38, at 311.
83. Comment, supra note 38, at 311.
84. San Diego, 450 U.S. at 655 n.22 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Kmiec,
Regulatory Takings: The Supreme Court Runs Out of Gas in San Diego, 57 IND.
L.J. 45, 51 (1982). See generally, Bauman, supra note 3, at 84-91.
85. Bauman, supra note 3, at 59-99.
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reach to exceed its manageable grasp. 6 After quieting the turbu-
lent theoretical disputes within takings analysis, the Court in-
creased the unpredictability of the expanded regulatory takings
analysis by highlighting a factor borrowed from eminent domain
de facto analysis: the length of time required to litigate these diffi-
cult issues.8 "
"Temporary takings" exist in the inverse condemnation de
facto taking body of law88 precisely because the sovereign refuses
to continue its offending conduct after the parties contest the issue
in court. Significantly, an important aspect of de facto taking anal-
ysis is the length of time that the sovereign's conduct interfered
with the owner's use of the property. 9 In First English, both the
majority and the dissent focused on the time dimension of regu-
latory takings. In First English, the government's action in deny-
ing the church the use of its property was a "considerable" 91 part
of the Court's decision both as to the number of years of the dis-
pute and because the Court weighed as a factor the time during
which the church was denied use of its property.
In regard to the Court's holding that the time of litigation for
dispute of the takings issue is a factor in whether the government's
conduct worked a taking, the validity of police power regulations is
a very different issue from the issue of whether an eminent domain
taking occurred. The most significant factor in regulatory takings
analysis is the absence of bright lines between permissible regula-
86. "A man's reach should exceed his grasp, or what's a heaven for?" Alexan-
der Pope, "On Man." See Kratovil, supra note 2, at 618.
87. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2388. The Court evidently endorsed Justice
Brennan's dissenting advice in San Diego, 450 U.S. at 658-59, when he suggested
a wholesale borrowing of eminent domain guidelines for the new regulatory cause
of action: "Ordinary principles determining the proper measure of just compensa-
tion, regularly applied in cases of permanent and temporary 'takings' involving
formal condemnation proceedings, occupations, and physical invasions, should
provide guidance to the courts in' the award of compensation for a regulatory
'taking.'"
88. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 374-75 (1984); Kim-
ball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 6 (1949) (temporary governmental
use of a private leasehold).
89. "Property is taken in the constitutional sense when inroads are made
upon the owner's use of it to an extent that ...a servitude has been acquired
S.. in the course of time." Dickinson, 331 U.S. at 748 (The government chose not
to institute eminent domain proceedings although flood waters interfered with the
owner's use of the property for more than six years).
90. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2387, 2393 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 2389.
1988]
13
Woodard: Constitutional Law: Is Time Running out for the Government to Dis
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1988
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
tion and impermissible regulatory takings.92 In regulatory takings
analysis, all of the current guidelines emanate from owner litiga-
tion, and such litigation is the stimulus for advancing judicial anal-
ysis. The Court now attempts to extend the judicial framework for
analyzing litigational delays prior to eminent domain action to an-
alyzing litigational delays prior to a court's holding that regulation
is impermissible. But the government's attempt to avoid compen-
sation is the only underlying factor that the two forms of litigation
have in common.93 In the eminent domain context, the govern-
ment's attempts to avoid compensating the owner usually only de-
lay the inevitable court ruling that the owner deserves compensa-
tion for the property taken. However, in the regulatory context,
the coincidental governmental intent to avoid compensation is
based on the court-engendered belief that regulation itself is per-
missible if it is reasonable, without respect to the disputes that fol-
low the enactment of the regulation.9 4 Only when courts can ex-
amine the circumstances of litigating the validity of a regulation
and conclude that the litigational delay was a tool to thwart the
landowner's fair compensation should the courts hold that the gov-
ernmental intent to prolong the delay was enough of a factor to
warrant a compensable taking.
Several courts in California foreshadowed the First English
decision. Those courts held that restrictive zoning ordinances con-
stituted de facto takings if the regulator's conduct interfered with
all use of the property for an unreasonably long length of time. 5
92. "There is no set formula to determine where regulation ends and taking
begins." Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594. As Justice Brennan points out in his dissent
to the San Diego majority opinion, this issue is tossed on a sea of ad hoc analysis.
Yet, Justice Brennan would burden planners with the responsibility of assessing
constitutional permissibility of regulations: "After all, a policeman must know the
Constitution, then why not a planner?" 450 U.S. at 661 n.26.
93. "[A] regulatory taking is. . . best judged by a trier of fact after a careful
balancing of all relevant factors presented by a case's circumstances, including the
government's intent . . . ." Bauman, supra note 3, at 31. Ironically, in the San
Diego dissent, Justice Brennan quoted a 1967 decision to support his argument
that "'the Constitution measures a taking of property not by what a State says,
or by what it intends, but by what it does.'" San Diego, 450 U.S. at 652-53 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original), quoting Hughes v. Washington, 389
U.S. 296, 298 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
94. See Comment, supra note 6.
95. Peacock v. County of Sacramento, 271 Cal. App. 845, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391,
399 (1969); Sneed v. County of Riverside, 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 212, 32 Cal. Rptr.
318 (1963).
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[R]easonableness . . . is the yardstick by which the validity
of a zoning ordinance is to be measured and reasonableness in
this connection is a matter of degree. A temporary restriction
upon land may be. . . a mere inconvenience where the same re-
striction indefinitely prolonged might possibly metamorphize into
oppression. 6
The lack of clear definition of "takings" terms hampers Court
examination of the circumstances of litigating the validity of regu-
lation. One source of confusion in takings analysis is the inability
of the members of the Court to agree on any aspect of the takings
analysis. This lack of agreement induces adoption of important as-
pects of regulatory law without wide bases of support.9 7 Because
takings analysis rests on a case-by-case circumstantial analysis,98
the Justices often concentrate on issues that will give them the re-
sults that they seek without regard to the impact of a decision on
the development of a general area of law. First English is a case in
point, with the majority adopting Justice Brennan's dissent in a
prior regulatory takings case. 9
In First English, Justices Stevens, Blackmun, and O'Connor
dissented from the Court's holding that a police power regulation
could ever constitute a taking. The dissent based its argument on
the legitimacy of the government's interest in protecting the
health, safety, and welfare of the community.1 0 0 The dissent also
deferred to the state court's decision as to the proper procedure by
which to remedy excessive regulation. 10 1 Both of these issues are
fraught with uncertainty, and the majority wisely avoided them,
since addressing them could have prevented indefinitely the reso-
lution of the theoretical problems.
96. Peacock, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 402 (The restriction affected the land for six
years). See also Johnson, supra note 5, at 595.
97. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2396 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Bauman, supra
note 3, at 84. In San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, Justices Blackmun, Stevens, Rehnquist,
White, and Chief Justice Burger were the majority. Justices Brennan, Stewart,
Marshall, and Powell dissented, and Justice Rehnquist concurred with the major-
ity on the procedural dismissal of the case while agreeing with the dissent. In
First English, Chief Justice Rehnquist voiced the majority opinion, joined by Jus-
tices Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell, and Scalia. Justice Stevens dissented,
joined in parts of his dissent by Justices Blackmun and O'Connor.
98. Id. at 2393.
99. Id. at 2394.
100. Id. at 2391.
101. Id. at 2396.
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Justice Stevens, writing alone in part of the dissent, severely
criticized the majority opinion for differentiating between "normal
delays" associated with governmental decisions that insulated the
government from liability for monetary compensation and delays
due to valid litigation of whether a regulation was invalid and for
which the government was liable.1 2 Justice Stevens classified the
differentiation as an "artificial distinction" which the majority
could not justify. 03
Viewing the "temporary" regulatory takings from the govern-
ment's viewpoint, Justice Stevens pointed out several of the direct
effects of the First English decision. In addition to disagreeing
with the majority on the basic issue of whether a taking occurred,
Justice Stevens saw three major effects of the decision. First, the
"mere duty to defend" its conduct would chill the regulator's land-
use regulation of private property. ' Second, Justice Stevens visu-
alized regulations as three-dimensional and emphasized that the
single dimension of duration of the restriction is indivisible from
the dimensions of the extent of the interference and the amount of
property affected by the regulation. 05 Last, Justice Stevens re-
served his harshest criticism of the majority for its failure to "ex-
plain why there is a constitutional distinction between denial of all
use of the property during. . . 'normal delays' and an equally total
denial for the same length of time in order to determine whether a
regulation has 'gone too far' to be sustained."' 0 6
In addition to Justice Stevens's concerns, other more troubling
practical aspects of the decision arise. Because the public fisc is at
risk for the source of the new remedy, regulators are less likely to
exercise police powers that prohibit substantial use of the prop-
erty, regardless of the time duration of the ban. 0 7 Regulators are
less likely to exercise powers in areas of private activity in which
courts indicate their willingness to assess takings. 0 8 Regulators
will attempt to anticipate at the onset of a challenge whether a
court is likely to find that the regulation worked a taking, or if not,
102. Id. at 2395.
103. Id. at 2396.
104. Id. at 2390.
105. Id. at 2394.
106. Id. at 2395.
107. Bauman, supra note 3, at 46-47; Kratovil, supra note 2, at 613, 617.
108. "When the court has plainly delineated its views on the appropriate
zoning and the municipality thereafter adopts an amendment that disregards the
court's decision, difficult questions arise." Kratovil, supra note 2, at 620.
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whether the basis for the regulation warrants a dispute with the
owner. Despite the Court's assurances that judicial interpretation
will not usurp legislative prerogative, judicial analyses will have
significant impact on regulator conduct.10
Finally, a paradoxical situation confronts the regulator when
an owner challenges the regulation in court. Despite the regulator's
internal assessment that a court will uphold the regulation as a
valid exercise of police powers, protracted litigation itself is more
likely to result in a taking. The longer the litigation, the greater
the amount of compensation for which the regulator is liable. Liti-
gation in which relatively close questions of whether the regulation
is permissible could actually result in owners dragging out the liti-
gation to enhance their chances of the court finding a taking, par-
ticularly if the denial of use is substantial enough."'
The courts' reaction to government abuses of regulatory power
is evident in commentary that speculated on the long-overdue
compensation remedy, a remedy which the Court's ruminations fi-
nally produced. Although the new remedy addresses willful delay
by governmental bodies, the danger exists that courts will perceive
that meritorious governmental defenses of regulation are overzeal-
ous and subsequently dilatory. Statements such as the one that
follows, although taken somewhat out of context, give evidence of
thought processes leading to such a judicial conclusion: "It is un-
realistic to talk of usurpation of legislative power, for if the legisla-
ture had done its sworn duty, the action would never have been
brought in the first place.'
Governmental bodies may decide that prompt rescission .of the
offending regulation before the owner initiates court action would
effectively limit liability in two ways. Rescission would remove the
length of the dispute as a crucial factor affecting whether a taking
occurred and limit potential damages for the temporary taking if a
court finds a taking. The ultimate result of designating the length
of litigation time as a factor in takings analysis is the same kind of
delaying tactic by which regulators formerly abused the owners.
An inevitable effect of the First English decision is to shift
judicial emphasis to another dimension" 2 of the regulatory takings
109. For more practical effects, see Johnson, supra note 5, at 594-97.
110. An interesting side question is whether municipal attorneys would be
subject to malpractice claims for improperly evaluating the government's pros-
pects of winning a takings challenge.
111. Kratovil, supra note 2, at 618.
112. Bauman, supra note 3, at 40; First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2394 (Stevens,
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analysis, the amount of the interference with the property use. As
the Court dictated in First English, the owner must allege that the
regulation denied the owner total use of the property." 3 To pre-
vent exactly the kind of inhibitions of governmental action dis-
cussed above, the courts will look at the extent of the interference
with use with a much more critical eye. More critical evaluation of
the amount of interference leads the courts back to the problems
of takings analysis from which the Court intended to salvage them
with the First English decision.
CONCLUSION
In First English, the Supreme Court decided perhaps the most
important takings case since Pennsylvania Coal, in which the
Court first held that regulations could rise to the level of a taking.
The Court extended the full complement of takings causes of ac-
tions and remedies to private interests against overprotected gov-
ernmental interests. As a result, the tide of judicial deference to
governmental action clearly wanes in favor of fairer treatment of
private property rights.
The First English decision undoubtedly will put every regula-
tor on the defensive. The Court decided to analyze regulatory tak-
ings with the same framework that it uses for eminent domain
analysis. It finally recognized that some property rights are so im-
portant that to deprive the owner of their uses is inherently unfair
and uncomplementary to traditional constitutional constraints.
At the same time that the Court ties the loose cannon of regu-
latory takings analysis to the smoothly sailing ship of eminent do-
main, however, one cannonball careens madly from stem to stern.
The Court's unfortunate highlighting of the litigation time aspect
of reglulatory takings will damage the new cause of action as much
as the extension of the traditional framework mends in abuses of
the regulatory process.
Sharon A. Woodard
J., dissenting).
113. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2385 n.8, 2389.
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